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Abstract
We hypothesize that cultural narratives such as myths and folktales are more likely to achieve cultural
stability if they correspond to a minimally counterintuitive (MCI) cognitive template that includes
mostly intuitive concepts combined with a minority of counterintuitive ones. Two studies tested this hy-
pothesis, examining whether this template produces a memory advantage, and whether this memory ad-
vantage explains the cultural success of folktales. In a controlled laboratory setting, Study 1 found that
an MCI template produces a memory advantage after a 1-week delay, relative to entirely intuitive or
maximally counterintuitive cognitive templates. Using archival methods, Study 2 examined the cogni-
tive structure of Grimm Brothers folktales. Compared to culturally unsuccessful folktales, those that
were demonstrably successful were especially likely to fit an MCI template. These findings highlight
the role of human memory processes in cultural evolution.
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1. Introduction
What makes a narrative culturally successful? Within any culture, religious tales, folktales,
and other narratives are generated by the thousands; but only a few of these tales actually
achieve sustained popularity. (We all know “Cinderella,” for instance; but “The Donkey Let-
tuce” never quite caught on.) Of the many ecological and psychological factors that influence
the extent to which any such narrative achieves cultural success, mnemonic resilience may be
one of the most important. Memorability places necessary constraints on the cultural transmis-
sion of narratives and ideas. In oral traditions that characterize most of human cultures
throughout history, a narrative cannot be transmitted and achieve cultural success unless it
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stands the test of memory (Rubin, 1995; Sperber, 1996). Therefore, all else being equal, a more
memorable narrative has a competitive advantage over a less memorable one. Because any cul-
tural narrative is likely to go through several generations of repeated transmission and recall,
this advantage, even if small at the start, accumulates from generation to generation, leading to
massive differences in eventual cultural success.
The psychology of cognition in general, and memory in particular, is thus of great relevance
to the anthropological study of how cultural belief systems emerge. Ideas and narratives are not
acquired and transmitted through a process by which culture “impinges” on a passive human
mind. Rather, the minds of recipients of cultural materials selectively represent, retain, trans-
form, and transmit information. Thus the ordinary biases and transformations in human mem-
ory can constrain the content of cultural beliefs. Building on prior research on the cognitive
processes that influence the cultural transmission of concepts (e.g., Barrett, 2000; Boyer &
Ramble, 2001), we examine the role of cognitive processes in the cultural transmission of lists
of ideas and narratives. We hypothesize that narratives combining mostly intuitive concepts
with a minority of counterintuitive ones enjoy a memory advantage, and as a result achieve cul-
tural success. Such an MCI template (Barrett, 2000) may be no accident. Indeed, we propose
that it may be a recipe for cultural success: Compared to narratives that fit other templates (e.g.,
no counterintuitive concepts at all; many counterintuitive concepts), those that are MCI may be
especially memorable and, therefore, more likely to achieve cultural stability as well.
1.1. Intuitive and counterintuitive concepts in cultural narratives
Before examining the cognitive factors that contribute to the cultural success of narratives,
we consider current theorizing and research on the cultural success of various intuitive and
counterintuitive concepts that proliferate in cultural narratives. What makes a concept “intu-
itive” or “counterintuitive”? As several psychologists and anthropologists have noted, the key
is whether the concept is consistent with, or violates, ontological assumptions about the prop-
erties of ordinary objects (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 1992; Keil, 1989; see also Atran & Sperber,
1991).
Intuitive concepts are intuitive because built into them are implicit inferences about their
properties. These intuitive inferences are rarely articulated explicitly. Rather, they are as-
sumed, and make the concepts comprehensible and communicable. For example, the concept
bird involves the implicit inference that birds fly, that they grow and die, that they drink when
thirsty. These inferences are guided by intuitive ontology (Keil, 1989), or core assumptions
about the basic categories of existence, such as intentional beings, animals, inanimate objects,
and events. Ontology is psychologically important, because it determines the appropriateness
of inferences. For example, knowing that birds belong to the ontological category ANIMAL
affords “automatic” inferences about biological properties, but not necessarily intentional
agent properties. These inferences are possible because ontology is in turn governed by do-
main-specific “theories”—of mind, biology, and physics—that provide commonsense expec-
tancies and explanations for the workings of each ontological category.
There are important cultural variations in many aspects of domain-specific theories: theory
of mind (e.g., Lillard, 1998; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), biology (e.g., Medin & Atran,
1999), and physics (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1998). However, certain core elements of these theo-
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ries appear so early, and are so widespread across human societies, that they may turn out to be
psychological primitives that make cultural learning possible. For example, babies as young as
4 months already possess a “theory of physics,” having a notion of what counts as a solid ob-
ject, and assuming, for example, that an object cannot be in different places at the same time, or
that a solid object cannot pass through another solid object (Baillargeon, 1998; Carey &
Spelke, 1994; Leslie, 1982; Spelke, 1990). Similarly, preschoolers and adults in most cultures
known to anthropologists have a “theory of biology,” which dictates that species have biologi-
cal “essences” and that superficial transformations performed on an animal do not alter its spe-
cies-specific essence (Atran, 1998; Berlin, 1992; Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973; Gelman
& Hirschfeld, 1998; Keil, 1994). Preschoolers and adults across cultures also have an elaborate
“theory of mind,” which entails, among other things, the attribution of beliefs and desires to
people, and the appreciation that people may have false beliefs (Avis & Harris, 1991; Callahan
et al., 2005; Flavell, Zhang, Zou, Dong, & Qui, 1983; Gardner, Harris, Ohmoto, & Hamazaki,
1988).
Unlike everyday natural concepts with properties consistent with ontological expectations,
there are many other concepts that violate those expectations. Ghosts that walk through walls,
frogs that talk, mountains that are invisible to the human eye—these and many other fanciful
concepts are inconsistent with intuitive theories of mind, biology, and physics and thus are
“counterintuitive.” (For broad discussions of intuitive and counterintuitive concepts in culture
and religion, see Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 1994a, 1994b, 2003;
Sperber, 1996). Interestingly, despite their obvious incompatibility with ontological expecta-
tions—or assumptions about what is actually possible in the real world—these kinds of
counterintuitive concepts appear regularly in religious traditions, folktales, myths, and legends
around the world (e.g., see Boyer, 1994b, 2001).
1.2. Past research on the cognitive optimality of MCI concepts
The effect of unusual or surprising story elements on recall has been examined under the ru-
bric of schema theory, which proposes that recall is a joint product of the interaction between
general knowledge structures or expectancies and input information. There is a consensus that
schema-relevant information is better remembered than schema-irrelevant information (for re-
views, see Alba & Hasher, 1983; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). However a complex pat-
tern of findings has emerged as to whether recall is enhanced by schema-consistent versus
schema-inconsistent information. Incongruous or surprising elements have often been found
to produce superior recall under some conditions (e.g., Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Brewer,
1985; Davidson, 1994; McCabe & Peterson, 1990; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Similar ef-
fects have been observed in list-learning paradigms, in which conceptually incongruous items
enjoy superior recall (e.g., Waddill & McDaniel, 1998).
However unusual story elements differ from supernatural elements in two important ways.
First, unusual story elements disrupt story structure, whereas supernatural elements in a folk-
tale or religion are integral to the story structure (Boyer & Ramble, 2001). Second, whereas un-
usual elements in a story involve a schema or script violation that is otherwise consistent with
intuitive theories, counterintuitive elements found in folktales, myths, and religions involve
ontological violations that are incongruent with intuitive theories. These differences may im-
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plicate different processes and may result in different recall effects (see, for example, Boyer &
Ramble, 2001). Although instructive, these earlier studies on the effect of schema violations
have not examined counterintuitive supernatural elements that are recurrent and widespread
features of cultures, which is the focus of this research.
One of the earliest accounts of the memorability and transmission of counterintuitive super-
natural cultural narratives was Bartlett’s (1932) classic study of “the war of the ghosts.” Bart-
lett examined the ways by which British university students remembered and then transmitted
a culturally unfamiliar story, in this case a Native American folktale. Interestingly, over several
generations of retelling the story, some culturally unfamiliar items or events were dropped
from the retelling. Other unfamiliar items were distorted, being replaced by more familiar
items. But Bartlett’s striking finding was that the very notion of the ghosts—so central to the
original story—was gradually eliminated from the retellings, suggesting that counterintuitive
elements are at a cognitive disadvantage.
In recent years, there has been growing empirical work on the cognitive factors that constrain
the cultural success of beliefs, and this research yields a more complex perspective (Barrett &
Keil, 1996; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Boyer, & Ramble, 2001). Spirits and other supernatural con-
cepts found in culturally successful narratives (such as religious mythologies) are MCI, having
properties that are partially, but not entirely, counterintuitive (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2003).
Spirits may be invisible or may pass through solid objects; but otherwise they possess the intu-
itive properties of ordinary intentional agents. Supernatural agents may have supernatural abili-
ties of perception, but they also obey many of the mundane laws of folk physics and folk biology
(e.g., they cannot occupy more than one physical location at a time; they get hungry). Indeed, it
appears that people assume a substantial set of intuitive properties even for beings that are puta-
tively supernatural: Controlled experiments by Barrett and Keil (1996) indicated that people
spontaneouslyanthropomorphizeGodin their reasoning,even ifdoingsocontradicts their stated
theological beliefs. Culturally successful materials also favor minimal rather than large viola-
tions of ontological expectations. In a content analysis of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Kelly & Keil
(1985) found that the ontological transformations experienced by the characters followed a dis-
tinctpattern:Thenumberof transformationsofoneontologicalcategory tootherontologicalcat-
egories decreased as the distance between the two categories increased. Thus, it was far more
likely for a conscious being to be transformed into an animal, than a conscious being to be trans-
formed into an inanimate object. Transformations that occur across wide swaths of ontological
distance may be just too counterintuitive to be psychologically appealing.
If indeed MCI concepts are cognitively optimal, they should enjoy a cognitive advantage in
memory and transmission advantage in communication. Recent studies have supported this
conclusion. In a series of experiments, Barrett and Nyhof (2001) asked participants to remem-
ber and retell stories containing intuitive, intuitive but bizarre, and counterintuitive events or
objects. After 3 generations of retelling the story, the proportion of items recalled in each cate-
gory was measured. Results indicated that both counterintuitive and intuitive but bizarre items
were remembered in greater proportions than intuitive items. Furthermore, the same recall ad-
vantage of MCI items was found after a 3-month delay; this is an important finding, given that
in most natural settings in which cultural narratives evolve, recall after a long delay is the criti-
cal factor. An idea that is memorable immediately, but fades over time, could not be culturally
successful.
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Another important finding is that the effect of counterintuitiveness on recall is not linear.
Too many ontological violations render a concept too counterintuitive to be comprehensible
and memorable. Boyer and Ramble (2001) found that concepts with too many violations were
recalled less well than those that were MCI. These results are not only observed immediately
after exposure, but also after a 3-month delay—and in cultural samples as diverse as the mid-
western United States, France, Gabon, and Nepal (Boyer & Ramble, 2001). Consistent with
the idea that this memory advantage is related to cultural success, the anthropological literature
confirms that religious concepts with too many ontological violations are rather rare (Boyer,
1994b). Contrary to the apparent conclusion from Bartlett’s classic experiments, these more
recent empirical results confirm the idea that MCI concepts are better recalled and transmitted
than intuitive ones.
1.3. Cognitive optimality at the level of narratives
This existing body of evidence focuses on the extent to which specific narrative elements
(e.g., supernatural agents or events) are counterintuitive and the memorability and transmis-
sion advantage of those elements. The results imply that MCI elements are especially likely to
proliferate in cultural narratives. This implication, however, is inconsistent with the apparent
structure of culturally important narratives. If MCI narrative elements enjoy better long-term
recall than other concepts, they should dominate religions, folktales, and myths at a much
greater rate than is actually observed. However even a casual perusal of culturally successful
materials reveals that counterintuitive narrative elements are in the minority. Although coun-
terintuitive concepts regularly appear in popular cultural narratives, the sheer number of them
is typically dwarfed by the number of more mundane, intuitive concepts. The Bible, for exam-
ple, is a succession of mundane events interspersed with a few counterintuitive occurrences,
such as miracles and the appearance of angels. In the Grimm Brothers folktales, the tale of
“Little Red Riding Hood”—one of the most celebrated folktales in Western culture—is mostly
a series of mundane occurrences, seasoned with only two counterintuitive ones (the talking
wolf, and Grandmother and the little girl coming out of the wolf’s belly alive). Similarly, the
“Beauty and the Beast” has only three such violations (the Beast as an animal with human
properties, the magic mirror, and the transformation from beast to human). Why do MCI con-
cepts not dominate the narrative structure of religions, folktales, and myths?
The answer to this apparent puzzle may lie in examining the memorability of a narrative as a
single unit of transmission, rather than the individual ideas that are embedded in these narra-
tives. The unit of cultural transmission is often, but not always, an individual concept. Under
many conditions, a series of events or ideas are transmitted together as a single unit of culture
(Rubin, 1995). Furthermore, recall of individual items is influenced by the narrative context in
which the items are embedded (Thorndyke, 1977). Therefore, cognitive optimality might be at
work not only at the level of individual narrative elements, but at the level of whole narrative
structures as well.
Just as specific narrative elements are especially memorable if they are MCI (Barrett, 2000,
Boyer, 2003), so too, whole narratives are likely to be especially memorable if they are MCI—
if they contain a small number of MCI concepts. If indeed MCI narratives enjoy a memory and
transmission advantage (relative to narratives with no counterintuitive elements, or those that
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have an abundance of counterintuitive elements), then cognitive selection would prevent MCI
ideas from taking over entire narratives.
Previous research has not addressed cognitive optimality at the narrative level. For instance,
in prior studies, equal proportions of intuitive and counterintuitive concepts were used in each
story (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001). The research reported in this article
was designed explicitly to test the hypotheses that MCI narratives are more memorable, and
that they therefore enjoy more cultural success than narratives fitting alternative cognitive tem-
plates. Study 1 examined whether MCI idea lists enjoy better recall after a 1-week delay than
all-intuitive or maximally intuitive ones. In Study 2, we examined whether this memory bias
explains the cultural success of folktales in the Grimm Brothers collection, such that MCI folk-
tales are more likely to attain sustained popularity than those that do not. In both studies we ex-
pected the relation between minimal counterintuitiveness and cognitive or cultural success to
fit a nonlinear inverted U-shaped curve.
2. Study 1: Memory for MCI lists
2.1. Overview
We conducted an experiment to examine the memorability of MCI idea lists. To create lists
with different proportions of counterintuitive ideas, we first created individual intuitive and
counterintuitive items. The latter were created by transferring a property from its intuitive do-
main to a novel domain (e.g., thirsty door). Recall was measured after a 3-min delay, and after a
1-week delay. This latter measure was the central one, as it reflects the proper role of recall in
the cultural evolution of narrative structures. This study differed from previous ones in a num-
ber of important ways. One difference is of primary interest: Lists were used that varied in the
relative proportion of intuitive (INT) and MCI ideas. This allowed us to test the cognitive
optimality hypothesis at the level of lists of ideas, with implications for the memorability of
narratives, as well as at the level of the individual ideas.
Several other methodological differences are notable as well. First, the INT and MCI ideas
were rigorously matched, such that each word served as its own control. In addition, partici-
pants were told that they were in an experiment about memory, and were given a list of items to
remember, without providing a story context. This served two purposes. First, this list-learning
format provided as neutral a context as possible to measure recall, eliminating any effects due
to participants’ notions of what would be conversationally interesting to report. Second, al-
though stories are an important part of culturally successful materials, many of these stories of-
ten begin their life as a set of discrete images and events, with little or no story structure. Our
experimental format simulated the degraded informational context of nascent cultural materi-
als. Finally, basic-level concepts were used—for example, door, cat, infant (Rosch, Mervis,
Grey, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976).
Two questions were examined: (a) At the level of individual ideas, which ones enjoy better
recall: MCI ideas or their intuitive counterparts? (b) At the level of the entire list, what propor-
tion of intuitive to MCI ideas maximizes recall of the entire list? It was expected, consistent
with prior research, that individual MCI ideas would enjoy a recall advantage over intuitive
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ones. More central to this research, it was expected that at the list level, MCI lists would enjoy
the highest rate of recall (compared to lists with equal proportions of intuitive and MCI ideas,
those composed entirely of intuitive ideas, and those composed primarily of MCI ideas).
2.2. Method
2.2.1. Generation of intuitive and counterintuitive items
Two-word statements that represented INT and MCI items were generated. Each statement
consisted of a concept and one property that modified it. INT statements were created by using
a property that was appropriate to the ontological category (e.g., closing door). MCI statements
were created by modifying the concept by a property that was transferred from another onto-
logical category (e.g., thirsty door). This procedure explicitly operationalizes minimal coun-
terintuitiveness as the transfer of a property associated with the core conceptual domains of
folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology, from an appropriate ontological category of
person, animal, plant, substance, to an inappropriate one (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). For ex-
ample, a “thirsty door” transfers a folkbiological property (thirst) from its proper category (an-
imal or plant) to an improper category (inert object/substance).
For each INT statement, a matching MCI statement was generated (e.g., closing cat). Simi-
larly, for each MCI statement, a matching INT statement was generated (e.g., thirsty cat). This
resulted in a set of four statements that achieved a counterbalanced design, each word in each
statement serving as its own control. Thus, “cat,” “door,” “closing,” and “thirsty” were equally
likely to appear in a INT item as in an MCI item. Table 1 shows examples of the statements
To ensure that the INT and MCI statements were successfully created, ten pretest partici-
pants were asked to rate the statements on a 5-point scale anchored by the labels “ordinary”
and “out of the ordinary.” Of those, 36 pairs of INT, and 36 pairs of MCI that received mean rat-
ings less than 2 (for INT) or mean ratings more than 4 (for MCI) were retained (for a total of 18
items). As a second manipulation check, a separate group of 28 participants (13 men, 15
women, age M = 26) who were blind to the purpose of the study rated the 18 items in four dif-
ferent item versions, on a 6-point scale anchored by the labels “very natural” and “very super-
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Table 1
Selected examples of intuitive statements (INT) and their minimally
counterintuitive (MCI) counterparts, in a counterbalanced design
INT MCI
1. Closing door Thirsty door
Thirsty cat Closing cat
2. Four-legged table Confused table
Confused student Four-legged student
3. Drying coat Mischievous coat
Mischievous comment Drying comment
4. Clenched fist Impatient fist
Impatient man Clenched man
5. Sleeping dog Contrived dog
Contrived parable Sleeping parable
natural.” MCI items were rated to be substantially less natural than INT items, F(1, 24) =
45.57, p < .001, and this effect did not interact with the counterbalanced item type, F < 1.
2.2.2. Participants
One hundred eight undergraduate students in an introductory psychology class at a large
midwestern American university participated in this study. Of those 108, 14 spoke English as a
foreign language and, therefore, were dropped from the analysis.1 Of the remaining 94 (58 fe-
male, 36 male) participants, 82 took part in the second recall task after a 1-week delay.
2.2.3. Experimental manipulation
Two experimental manipulations were constructed. The first was a (within-subjects) manip-
ulation of the intuitive content of each item: Some items were INT, others were MCI. The sec-
ond was a (between-group) manipulation of the proportion of INT and MCI items. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions each corresponding to a differ-
ent list structure:
1. Entirely intuitive (18 INT items, 0 MCI items).
2. Minimally counterintuitive (13 INT items, 5 MCI items).
3. Equal frequencies (9 INT items, 9 MCI items).
4. Mostly counterintuitive (5 INT items, 13 MCI items).
In the “equal frequencies” condition, four different narrative lists were created, each of
which included one of the four possible concept + modifier combinations: for example, closing
door (INT), thirsty cat (INT), thirsty door (MCI), closing cat (MCI). Thus the “equal frequen-
cies” condition controlled for any possible baseline differences in the memorability of these
concepts and modifiers. For the other three experimental conditions, two different lists were
created, by randomly selecting a subset of the INT and MCI items from those used in the
“equal frequencies” condition.
2.2.4. Procedure
Participants were tested in a classroom setting, using questionnaires. They were timed for
each part of the study. The first page of the questionnaire contained instructions: They were
asked to study the items on the list, on the next page to recall them later. After spending 5 min
studying the list, the experimenter signaled them to turn to the following page, on which they
spent 3 min completing a distractor task. Then they turned the page and listed as many of the
items as they could remember on a blank sheet. They were given 5 min to complete this recall
task. After exactly 1 week, the same experimenter gave the same participants a surprise recall
task. In 5 min, they wrote down on a blank sheet of paper as many of the statements as they
could recall from the week before.
2.2.5. Dependent measures
Three dependent variables were assessed. Free recall after a 3-min distractor task, delayed
free recall again after a 1-week distractor task, and memory degradation (immediate recall mi-
nus delayed recall). Recall was measured as follows: Participants received a score of 2 for re-
calling the two-word statement fully, a score of 1 for recalling only one of the two words in the
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statement, and a score of 0 for failing to recall any part of the statement. Remembering words
or statements that did not appear on the list was considered failure to recall and given a score
of 0.
2.3. Results
Based on this formula, a percentage measure of recalled items was computed in each condi-
tion. In addition, an INT percentage score was calculated by adding up the scores for each
statement, and dividing the sum by the number of INT statements that appeared on the given
list. Similarly, an overall MCI percentage score was calculated for each participant (except in
the entirely intuitive condition). Thus, for both immediate and delayed recall, each participant
had an overall recall score, an INT score, and an MCI score. Comparisons of overall recall
across the four experimental conditions, as well as the memory degradation (immediate minus
delayed) measure tested the novel hypothesis that MCI lists are more memorable. Direct com-
parison between INT and MCI indexes within each condition tested the hypothesis (supported
in previous research) that MCI elements are more memorable.
2.3.1. Immediate recall
Fig. 1 presents the results for overall recall, broken down according to experimental condi-
tion. Across the four experimental conditions, a linear contrast indicated that overall recall lev-
els increased as the proportion of counterintuitive elements decreased, the differences ap-
proaching significance, t(90) = 1.60, p = .11. The three experimental conditions containing
counterintuitives did not differ from one another, all t < 1. As to specific items, contrary to pre-
vious findings, a paired-samples t test revealed a recall advantage associated with INT items
over MCI ones, M = 62.82 (SD = 23.18) versus M = 53.74 (SD = 24.10), respectively; t(68) =
3.49, p < .001. (These analyses exclude participants in the entirely intuitive condition.) This
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Fig. 1. Immediate recall by proportion of intuitive and MCI ideas.
mean difference was observed within all three conditions containing counterintuitive elements
(p < .05).
2.3.2. Delayed 1-week recall
Delayed recall is the central focus of this study, because it plays the primary role in cultural
transmission. Fig. 2 reveals that there were effects of the experimental manipulation on overall
delayed recall,2 and these effects are consistent with the hypothesized superiority of lists that
fit an MCI template and the hypothesized curvilinear effect of counterintuitive items on recall.
A planned comparison indicated that recall was higher in the MCI condition compared to the
combined mean in the other three conditions, t(78) = 1.88, p = .05.
As one might expect, there was a massive overall memory degradation from the immediate
recall context (M = 60.67, SD = 22.03) to delayed recall after a week (M = 25.20, SD = 16.70),
t(81) = 18.97, p < .001. Nevertheless, the memory advantage associated with intuitive elements
persisted, M = 28.38 (SD = 20.43) versus M = 22.39 (SD = 17.41), t(59) = 2.93, p < .005 (except
there was no effect within the mostly counterintuitive condition, t < 1).
2.3.3. Memory degradation
Subtracting delayed recall from immediate recall produced a measure of memory degrada-
tion. This is yet another measure of the cultural resilience of cognitive templates. Such a mea-
sure is conceptually distinct from delayed recall and captures the extent to which a cognitive
structure, once encoded, degrades for a given period of time. As Figure 3 indicates, the MCI
list had the least memory degradation compared to the combined mean of the three other con-
ditions, t(78) = 1.93, p = .06. No overall differences were found between intuitive and MCI
items across the three conditions, t(59) = 1.18, p = ns. Nor were there differences in each condi-
tion (all ps = ns).
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Fig. 2. Delayed 1-week recall by proportion of intuitive and MCI ideas.
2.4. Discussion
Consistent with the central hypothesis in this article, the results confirmed that cognitive
optimality at the level of lists of ideas is important. Although immediate recall, if anything, was
a linear function of proportion of counterintuitives and did not favor MCI lists, delayed recall
did. MCI lists were the most cognitively resilient. Thus, although minimal counterintuitiveness
may not always enhance the memorability of specific ideas, at a different level of analysis it
does appear to enhance the memorability of lists of ideas. This may provide the recipe for a
successful cultural knowledge structure; indeed it is the cognitive template that characterizes
many popular narratives, including religious accounts, myths, fables, and folktales.
As to ideas, a complex pattern of recall emerged. Unlike the findings of Barrett and Nyhof
(2001) and Boyer and Ramble (2001), but consistent with the early classic experiments of
Bartlett (1932), intuitive ideas showed better recall rates than MCI ones. This was the case im-
mediately, as well as after a 1-week delay. The only exception to this pattern was when
counterintuitives made up the majority of items, in which case there were no differences in de-
layed recall rates. Also there was no advantage for intuitive items in memory degradation. Be-
cause the two kinds of elements were rigorously matched (i.e., each word in each element was
equally likely to occur in intuitive and MCI items), this recall advantage is clearly attributable
to intuitiveness, rather than to other variables related to word recall. Subsequently, we have
replicated this finding showing a long-term recall advantage for intuitive items (after 1 week
and also after 3 months), using more stringent criteria for counterintuitiveness, with American
college students, as well as Itza’ Maya villagers in the Mexican Yucatan (for summaries, see
Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 2004).
How can we account for the superiority of intuitive items in recall? There are two important
methodological differences between our study and the prior experiments of Barrett and Nyhof
(2001) and Boyer and Ramble (2001). In those experiments, participants were given descrip-
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Fig. 3. Memory degradation (immediate minus delayed recall).
tions of counterintuitive objects or events in the abstract (“a person who was at two places at
the same time”), whereas in our experiment we provided basic-level descriptions (Rosch et al.,
1976) that are typically found in supernatural narratives (“talking frog”).
Second, in earlier studies participants were primed to expect counterintuitive events (as in
listening to a science fiction tale), or they were motivated to tell an interesting story (as in the
serial transmission paradigm). Such contexts are indeed important vessels of cultural transmis-
sion, as in storytelling events or religious rituals. On the other hand, they have the disadvantage
that they do not provide the ideal context in which the impact of recall, controlling for other
psychological or social variables, can be examined. This experiment used a simple memory
task that minimized the role of social or communicative factors that are related to, but distinct
from, the processes of memory. In such a context in which people expect that information will
conform to a natural course of events, they are likely to attend to and remember items that are
consistent with intuitive assumptions.
3. Study 2: Cultural success of MCI narratives in folktales
3.1. Overview
Study 1 revealed that MCI lists enjoy a recall advantage over time. This finding has implica-
tions for the interpersonal transmission of narrative structures such as folktales and for their
consequent popularity across a cultural landscape (Sperber, 1996). Memorable narrative struc-
tures are more likely to be transmitted, so they may enjoy a relative advantage in the market-
place of cultural beliefs; ultimately, they are likely to become and remain more popular. To test
this hypothesis, we examined the narrative features of folktales that have had varying degrees
of cultural success.
Our study focused on one of the most culturally important folktales in the Western tradi-
tion—collected by the Brothers Grimm. We empirically assessed the cultural success of each
folktale, and selected 42 tales for deeper analysis; 21 were relatively successful, and 21 were
demonstrably less successful. Two trained raters, unaware of our hypotheses, read each tale
and counted the number of counterintuitive elements in each folktale. In addition, 65 university
students read these folktales and rated them on a number of characteristics, including memora-
bility and ease of transmission. These procedures allowed us not only to test the hypothesis that
MCI tales are more likely to be culturally successful, but also to examine whether perceived
memorability mediates the relation between minimal counterintuitiveness and cultural
success.
3.2. Method
As a source, we used Manheim’s (1857/1977) English translation of the 1857 edition of the
Grimm Brothers collection (published originally in German). This collection contains 200
folktales, some of which are currently very well known by many European peoples (e.g.,
“Rapunzel,” “Hansel and Gretel, ” “Cinderella”) and many more stories that are relatively un-
known (e.g., “Brother Scamp, ” “The Donkey Lettuce, ” “A Good Stroke of Business”).
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3.2.1. Culturally successful and unsuccessful folktales
To obtain a measure of cultural popularity, we conducted 400 searches of the World Wide
Web, using the search engine Google. Each search included as keywords the exact title of each
folktale, along with the word “Grimm” (e.g., “Hefty Hans” + Grimm). Half the searches used
original German titles, and half used English translations of the titles (when necessary, we
searched for multiple English-translated titles). We added the word “Grimm” to all title
searches to ensure that the content of found Web sites was relevant to the folktales of interest.
For each search, we counted the number of Web page “hits” as a rough indicator of cultural
popularity. The English and German searches yielded convergent but not identical results,
r(41) = .49, p = .001.
Not surprisingly, there was great variability in the number of Web page hits across the 200
different folktales (ranging from 34,430 for “Cinderella” to 12 for “The Ditmarsh Tale of
Lies”). We used these numerical results as a basis for selecting a sample of culturally success-
ful tales. We identified a list of the 20 folktales whose German titles produced the most hits,
and another list of the 20 tales whose English titles produced the most hits. Together, these lists
were composed of 30 different folktales. We eliminated from further consideration 9 folktales
whose titles consisted simply of one or two common words (e.g., “The Moon”), as these tales
were especially likely to have produced spurious hits. Twenty-one tales remained, and these
defined our sample of culturally successful folktales (see Table 2); the mean number of hits
across these 21 tales was 8,404.
To select a comparison group of culturally unsuccessful folktales, we excluded from consid-
eration any tale that was among the 50 most popular identified by either the German-language
or English-language Google searches. This exclusion criterion left 126 relatively unsuccessful
folktales. From this set, we selected 21 tales (see Table 2), attempting to ensure that they were
of approximately the same length as those in the culturally successful sample (for both sam-
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Table 2
Culturally successful and unsuccessful folktales
Culturally successful (N = 21): “The Frog King” (“Iron Henry”) (1), “Little Brother and Little Sister” (11),
“Rapunzel” (12), “Hansel and Gretel” (15), “The Fisherman and his Wife” (19), “The Brave Little Tailor”
(20), “Ashputtle” (“Cinderella”) (21), “Mother Holle” (24), “Little Red Cap” (“Little Red Riding Hood”) (26),
“The Musicians of Bremen” (27), “The Devil with the Three Golden Hairs” (29), “Brier Rose” (“Sleeping
Beauty”) (50), “King Thrushbeard” (52), “Snow White” (53), “Rumpelstiltskin” (55), “Thousandfurs” (65),
“Jorinde and Joringel” (69), “Hans in Luck” (83), “The Lilting, Leaping Lark” (“Beauty and the Beast”) (88),
“The Goose Girl” (89), “Snow White and Rose Red” (161).
Culturally unsuccessful (N = 21): “A Good Stroke of Business” (7), “The Girl Without Hands” (31), “The Magic
Table, The Gold Donkey, and the Cudgel in the Sack” (36), “The Knapsack, the Hat, and the Horn” (54),
“Frederick and Liza-Kate” (59), “Farmer Little” (61), “Six Who Made Their Way in the World” (71), “The
Carnation” (76), “Brother Scamp” (81), “The Golden Children” (85), “The King of the Golden Mountain”
(92), “The Spirit in the Bottle” (99), “Bearskin” (101), “Hans My Hedgehog” (108), “The Jew in the
Brambles” (110), “The Prince Who Feared Nothing” (121), “The Donkey Lettuce” (122), “Faithful Ferdinand
and Faithless Ferdinand” (126), “Hefty Hans” (166), “The Poor Boy in the Grave” (185), “Maid Maleen”
(198).
Note. Included in brackets following each title is the order number where each folktale appeared in the 1857
Grimm Brothers collection.
ples, the mean length was slightly greater than four pages). Aside from this attempt to match on
length, selection was random. The mean number of Google hits across these 21 unsuccessful
tales was 148.
3.2.2. Counterintuitive and bizarre narrative elements
Two trained raters, unaware of our hypotheses, judged the number of counterintuitive ele-
ments in each of the 42 folktales. Raters counted as counterintuitive any narrative element that
defies intuitive assumptions about the ontological properties of the everyday world, such as the
categorical and relational properties that people in all cultures appear to spontaneously ascribe
to intentional agents (folk psychology), biological kinds (folk biology) and inert bodies (folk
physics; see Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2003). Recurring counterintuitive characters,
objects, or events were counted as single counterintuitive elements (e.g., a talking mirror may
appear multiple times in the same story, but counts as a single counterintuitive element). The
same raters also judged the number of bizarre elements. Narrative elements were counted as bi-
zarre if they were fancifully out-of-the-ordinary, but did not fit the strict definition of
counterintuitive as an ontological violation (e.g., a house made of gingerbread).
Across all 42 tales, interrater reliability was very high for counterintuitive elements
(Cronbach’s α = .92) and somewhat less high for bizarre elements (α = .70). For subsequent
analyses, indexes of counterintuitive and bizarre elements were created by calculating mean
judgments across the two raters.
3.2.3. Memorability and other psychological variables
Sixty-five students (age M = 20, 52 women and 13 men, 14 European Canadian, 36 East
Asian Canadian, and 15 other) at the University of British Columbia read six folktales apiece.
Each set of six was selected from the total sample of 42 folktales. Each rater read a different
combination of tales. Consequently, each folktale was read and rated by at least seven different
raters (21 tales were rated 10 times, 16 were rated 9 times, 1 was rated 8 times, and 4 tales were
rated 7 times).
After reading each tale, raters completed a questionnaire assessing their impressions. They
first indicated simply whether they were familiar with the folktale or not. Participants then
rated each tale on a number of attributes on 7-point scales (anchored by endpoints labeled
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). One rating assessed understandability (“This story was
easy to understand”). Another rating assessed ease of transmission (“If I wanted to tell this
story to other people, I could do so quickly and easily”). Two items assessed perceived interest
value (“This story was interesting,” and “Children would find this story interesting”). Two
items assessed memorability (“Right now if someone asked me to tell them the story that I just
read, I think I could recall all or most of the critical elements of the story,” and “One month
from now if someone asked me to tell them the story that I just read, I think I could recall all or
most of the critical elements of the story”). Two items assessed likelihood of transmission to
peers (“I would talk about this story with my friends,” and “If I told a friend this story, he or she
would tell it to other friends”). Two more items assessed likelihood of transmission to children
(“I would talk about this story with a 7-year-old child,” and “If I told a 7-year-old this story, he
or she would tell it to other 7-year-olds”). Finally, participants indicated their agreement with
the statement “This story contains a moral lesson.”
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Raters then completed one additional measure designed to assess the communicability of
each folktale. They were asked to consider a situation in which they were given an opportunity
to tell only a few of the stories to others, and they then ranked the stories to indicate their rela-
tive motivation to communicate each story to others. (A ranking of 1 was given to the story they
deemed most highly communicable; higher values indicate lower communicability).
Data were collapsed across raters so as to treat folktale as the unit of analysis. Thus, each da-
tum was composed of the mean of seven or more independent ratings of each story. Four con-
structs were assessed by two items apiece, and results on these items were combined to create
two-item composite indexes (for interest value, memorability, transmission to peers, and
transmission to children; Cronbach’s α .67).
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Manipulation check of cultural success variable
University students’ judgments of folktale familiarity provide a check on the
Web-search-based categorization of tales as successful or unsuccessful. Reassuringly, these
raters were more familiar with folktales categorized as successful, t(40) = 4.46, p < .001. On
average, culturally successful stories were familiar to 41% of raters, whereas unsuccessful sto-
ries were familiar to only 5% of raters. In subsequent analyses we treat cultural success as a di-
chotomous variable.
3.3.2. Are MCI folktales more culturally successful?
The hypothesized relation between counterintuitive elements and cultural success is nonlin-
ear. Although there is no necessary implication for differences in mean numbers of
counterintuitive elements (and no meaningful mean differences were observed), the hypothe-
sis predicts that there will be different shapes to the distributions of counterintuitive elements
within the samples of successful and unsuccessful folktales: Compared to unsuccessful folk-
tales, the distribution within the sample of successful tales should be more clearly unimodal,
and variability around that central tendency should be relatively low. The two frequency distri-
butions are displayed in Figure 4. As hypothesized, variability within the successful sample
(SD = 1.65) was lower than within the unsuccessful sample (SD = 2.19), F(1, 20) = 3.92, p =
.05 (using Levene’s test for equality of variances).Visual inspection reveals that, among cultur-
ally unsuccessful tales, the distribution is relatively flat and there is no single modal number of
counterintuitive elements. In contrast, among culturally successful tales, there is a clear mode:
The majority of these tales had a counterintuitive score between 2 and 3, inclusive. Using this
range (2 to 3) to define a set of MCI folktales, it is revealed that 76.5% of MCI tales are in the
culturally successful sample. In contrast, among stories with few or no counterintuitive ele-
ments (scores < 2), only 30% were culturally successful. Similarly, among stories with exces-
sive numbers of counterintuitive elements (scores > 3), only 33% were culturally successful.
Thus MCI folktales were more likely to be culturally successful, χ2(N = 42) = 8.00, p = .005.
Minimal counterintuitiveness correctly predicted cultural success of folktales 71.4% of the
time.
Whereas the two sample distributions clearly differ in terms of counterintuitive elements,
investigation of bizarre elements revealed no apparent differences. Within both samples, the
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number of bizarre elements in each story was relatively low (Ms = 1.17 and 1.36 for successful
and unsuccessful tales), and there were no meaningful differences in the shape of the distribu-
tions (e.g., variability was very similar; SDs = 1.10 and 0.98 for successful and unsuccessful
folktales, respectively). Thus, although the results indicate that cultural success is predicted by
the number of counterintuitive elements, success is not predicted by unusual narrative ele-
ments more broadly.
3.3.3. Are MCI folktales psychologically different?
The preceding set of results provided an empirical criterion for defining a folktale as MCI or
not, which then allowed us to test whether MCI folktales are perceived to be more memorable,
and more psychologically appealing in other ways as well. We divided the total sample of 42
folktales into two categories: those that were MCI and those that were not. Folktales were
counted as MCI if the mean number of counterintuitive elements fell between 2 and 3, inclu-
sive (N = 17). All other folktales (with scores less than 2 or greater than 3) were placed in the
comparison category (N = 25). Table 3 summarizes mean ratings on memorability and other
psychological variables and also provides inferential statistics pertaining to mean differences.
Consistent with the hypothesis, these results reveal that MCI folktales were perceived to be
more memorable. They were also perceived to be more understandable and easier to transmit
than folktales containing either too few or too many counterintuitive elements. No differences
were found for interest value, transmission value, and moral lesson. The difference approached
significance for communicability (see Table 3).
3.3.4. Are culturally successful folktales psychologically different?
These methods also allowed us to test whether culturally successful folktales also differ
from unsuccessful ones on ratings of memorability and other psychological variables
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Fig. 4. Frequency distribution of counterintuitive elements contained in samples of culturally successful and un-
successful folktales.
(Table 4). Results revealed mean differences on most rated characteristics, indicated that cul-
turally successful folktales were overall psychologically privileged. Culturally successful tales
were judged to be relatively more memorable, understandable, interesting, and easier to trans-
mit. In addition, all three indexes assessing likelihood of transmission revealed that compared
to demonstrably unsuccessful tales, culturally successful folktales are more likely to be com-
municated to others.
3.3.5. Does memorability mediate the relation between minimal
counterintuitiveness and cultural success?
The preceding results are consistent with the following chain of reasoning: MCI folktales
are more memorable and easier to understand and transmit to others. As a result of their supe-
rior memorability and understandability (but not necessarily other characteristics), they are
more likely to become culturally popular. If indeed a folktale’s memorability mediates the rela-
tion between its status as an MCI narrative and cultural success, then the observed relation be-
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Table 3
Mean ratings on psychological variables, as a function of whether a folktale is minimally counterintuitive or not
Minimally Counterintuitive
Yes No t p
Memorability 4.89 4.37 2.42 .02
Understandability 6.24 5.74 3.19 .003
Ease of transmission 5.46 5.02 2.02 .05
Interest value 5.03 4.83 0.97 .34
Transmission to peers 2.80 2.68 0.80 .43
Transmission to children 4.05 3.81 0.95 .35
Communicability (Rank) 3.27 3.71 1.58 .12
Moral lesson 4.59 4.43 0.50 .62
Table 4
Mean ratings on psychological variables, as a function of whether a folktale is culturally successful or not
Culturally Successful
Yes No t p
Memorability 5.03 4.13 4.95 < .001
Understandability 6.29 5.60 4.72 < .001
Ease of transmission 5.61 4.78 4.30 < .001
Interest value 5.20 4.61 3.00 .005
Transmission to peers 2.83 2.63 1.46 .15
Transmission to children 4.41 3.40 4.97 < .001
Communicability (Rank) 3.01 4.04 4.41 < .001
Moral lesson 4.76 4.23 1.67 .10
tween minimal counterintuitiveness and cultural success is likely to be reduced or eliminated
when controlling for the alleged cognitive mediator.
To investigate this possibility, folktales were categorized as either MCI or not (coded as 1
and 0, respectively) and as successful or not (coded as 1 and 0, respectively), according to the
categorization criteria described previously. The zero-order correlation between these two
variables was ϕ = .44, p = .005. The two memorability items, understandability and ease of
transmission, were strongly intercorrelated and showed very high internal reliability (α = .94);
as a result, they were combined to reflect a composite “cognitive facility” variable. Results
from a logistic regression analysis revealed that, when cognitive facility was included along
with minimal counterintuitiveness as predictors of cultural success, the predictive impact of
minimal counterintuitiveness was reduced from β = 1.93, Wald χ2(N = 42) = 7.31, p = .007, to β
= 1.45, Wald χ2(N = 42) = 2.60, p = .12. The cognitive facility variable continued to exert an im-
pact on cultural success, β = 3.22, Wald χ2(N = 42) = 9.03, p = .003. This result suggests that
the cognitive facility variable partially (but not completely) mediated the relation between a
folktale’s status as MCI and its eventual cultural success.
3.4. Discussion
As hypothesized—and consistent with previous findings—MCI folktales were rated as es-
pecially memorable. They also were rated as more understandable, and easier to transmit to
others. These cognitive features can have cultural consequences as well. The cultural success
of a folktale—defined by its popularity—was predicted by the number of counterintuitive ele-
ments. Success was not predicted by the number of intuitive but bizarre elements. Moreover,
there was evidence that the cognitive features of a folktale—specifically its memorability,
understandability, and ease of transmission—mediated the relation between minimal counter-
intuitiveness and cultural success. Although the inferences we can draw from the mediational
analysis are limited by the small sample size and the self-report-based measures, it is reassur-
ing that these measures appropriately distinguished the cognitive templates of folktales from
their cultural success. Whereas the minimal counterintuitiveness of a folktale predicted spe-
cific cognitive characteristics related to memorability, understandability, and ease of transmis-
sion, the cultural popularity of a folktale predicted a general favorability on most of the as-
sessed psychological measures. MCI narrative structures are not only more memorable, as
suggested by the recall evidence in Study 1, but this memorability also accounts in part for
their cultural success over time.
4. General discussion
Religious and supernatural narratives, including partly counterintuitive narratives that are
found in myths, legends, and folktales are extraordinarily resilient aspects of human cultures
around the world. Most of these narratives have been transmitted orally through generations
and have come to shape beliefs, values, and behaviors of people everywhere. What accounts
for the persistence of such narratives? No doubt many cognitive (Rubin, 1995), emotional
(Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001), and ecological (Anderson & Schooler, 1991; Berger &
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Heath, 2005) variables likely contribute to the cultural stability of such widespread belief
structures. In this article we examined one very important cognitive factor—the memorability
advantage that MCI narratives enjoy in the minds of cultural members. We found that MCI lists
that contain only a few counterintuitive elements degrade less over time and produce superior
recall in the long term (but not in the short term) over other templates that are either entirely in-
tuitive or excessively counterintuitive (Study 1). This cognitive advantage also selectively pre-
dicts the cultural success of one type of culturally important narrative—folktales (Study 2).
Elaborating on early insights by Sperber and others (1975; 1996, Lawson & McCauley,
1990), supernatural beliefs are being examined from a natural science perspective within what
has come to be known as the cognitivist program of religion (e.g., Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2000,
2004; Boyer, 1994b, 2001, 2003; Lawson & McCauley,1990; Pyysiäinen & Antonnen, 2002).
In recent years, growing research has been examining the cognitive and communicative pro-
cesses that shape and constrain cultural and religious beliefs (e.g., Barrett & Nyhof, 2001;
Boyer & Ramble, 2001). Whereas previous studies focused primarily on the cultural selection
of discrete supernatural concepts, here we examined the cultural selection of lists of ideas and
narratives that contain counterintuitive elements and often act as a coherent unit of transmis-
sion across minds.
We propose that MCI narratives are culturally successful partly because they enjoy a
stronger cognitive advantage in recall than other narrative templates. Although the specific
computational properties of this memory advantage remain an open question, we offer two
possible cognitive explanations for future empirical investigation. First, the literature on the
psychology of memory has emphasized that psychological factors that encourage deeper and
more elaborate processing of the information produce superior recall and greater number
and quality of inferences (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). MCI narra-
tives demand a greater cognitive effort in connecting the new material with background
knowledge, as well as the minority counterintuitive elements with the majority intuitive ele-
ments, spurring deeper and more elaborate processing. For example, work by Kintsch and
his colleagues (McNamara & Kintsch, 1996; McNamara, Kintsch, Songer, & Kintsch, 1996)
examining text comprehension found that texts with coherence gaps lead to superior recall
than texts with no gaps for learners with adequate background knowledge of the topic. A re-
verse pattern is found for learners with low background knowledge. Thus, texts that elicit
some degree of active inferencing on the part of the knowledgeable learner can help mem-
ory. However, as in the case of our findings and other research (e.g., Boyer & Ramble,
2001), this effect is curvilinear—too many coherence gaps are detrimental to memory and
learning (Kintsch, 1994).
Second, MCI narratives may enjoy a memory advantage because they generate the greatest
number of inferences with the least cognitive effort, as predicted by relevance theory (Sperber
& Wilson, 1986). That is, this cognitive template maximizes relevance by deviating from ordi-
nary expectations systematically but not excessively. These deviations involve evocative mini-
mal counterintuitions that are “relevant mysteries” (Sperber, 1996, p. 73). They are closely
connected to background knowledge, but do not admit to a final interpretation. As a result they
are attention arresting and inferentially rich, and therefore encourage further cognitive pro-
cessing and multiple interpretations over time that facilitate the cognitive stabilization of nar-
ratives. But only if the ensuing impossible worlds remain largely connected to the everyday
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world can supernatural narratives be mentally represented, rehearsed, and transmitted (Atran
& Sperber, 1991; Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2003; Sperber, 1975).
Regardless of which processes best explain the memory advantage, examining cognitive
optimality at the level of lists and narratives is critical. If cognitive optimality were operating at
the level of distinct concepts only, and if the lists and narratives in which they are embedded
did not have any cognitive effect, we would expect that the cognitive or cultural success of a
narrative would increase as a linear function of the proportion of MCI concepts. However this
was not the case. In Study 1, only lists with a few counterintuitive ideas facilitated long-term
recall. Similarly in Study 2, only folktales with a few counterintuitive elements facilitated cul-
tural success. In both studies, the effect of the number of counterintuitive elements on cogni-
tive or cultural success was a curvilinear function.
Counterintuitiveness, whether examined at the level of concepts or narratives, is distinct
from bizarre conceptual features that otherwise do not violate core expectancies rooted in core
domain-specific theories. Although Study 1 did not examine bizarreness as distinct from intu-
itive violations, evidence for this was found in Study 2, in which the number of bizarre ele-
ments had no predictive power in accounting for the cultural success of folktales, whereas
number of counterintuitive elements did. This is consistent with prior findings indicating that
intuitive violations and strangeness are two distinct processes and only the former reliably af-
fects the recall of supernatural ideas (e.g., Boyer & Ramble, 2001).
Our findings were robust, observable whether in a controlled laboratory context, or in the
content analysis of naturally occurring cultural narratives. However, one limitation regarding
these studies needs mention. In both studies the samples were representative of Western cul-
ture. It would be important to examine the extent to which MCI narratives are also found to fa-
vor cultural success in non-Western cultural contexts. In addition to laboratory experiments,
the rich traditions of folktales and myths of diverse cultures, such as Hindu Vedic tales, or the
Mayan Popul Vuh, could be examined in search of the MCI cognitive template described in this
article. Such cross-cultural extensions also could shed light on culture-specific cognitive struc-
tures that no doubt contribute to their cultural success (e.g., Brewer, 1985; Kintsch & Greene,
1978).
Finally, we emphasize that we do not claim that human memory was “designed” to favor
MCI narratives such as the ones we observe in religious and mythical traditions. Quite the con-
trary, such narratives were most likely culturally selected because they successfully exploited
the already existing cognitive architecture of the human memory system, which was naturally
selected to solve adaptive problems that were quite unrelated to the propagation and cultural
stabilization of counterintuitive narratives. Thus, memorability is necessary, but not sufficient
in the cultural selection of such narratives.
Once MCI narratives pass the test of long-term memorability, the supernatural elements in
such narratives are further culturally exploited to play a motivational function. Supernatural el-
ements externalize and emotionally relieve core existential human problems, including death,
deception, meaninglessness, and other problems that are factually and rationally intractable
(Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 2004). For example, there is evidence that
supernatural beliefs relieve the human awareness of mortality. Controlled motivational experi-
ments show that mortality awareness causes stronger religiosity, heightened belief in the di-
vine, and more faith in the efficacy of supernatural interventions (Norenzayan & Hansen,
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2006). Moreover, this effect emerges even when the supernatural agents are culturally alien,
such as Christians who are faced with belief in a supernatural Buddha or in shamanic spirits.
Cognitive factors alone cannot explain the cultural success of supernatural ideas and narra-
tives. It is the convergence of cognitive and motivational vectors that determine the over-
whelming presence and resilience of supernatural narratives in cultures around the world.
Notes
1. Including those participants who spoke English as a foreign language produced very
similar pattern of results, although the statistical tests yielded marginal effects in some
instances.
2. An alternative method of analyzing the effect of experimental condition of varying pro-
portions of counterintuitives would be to assess recall of intuitive items only. Such an
analysis was conducted and yielded the same pattern of results for the planned compari-
son of the mean in the MCI narrative condition against the combined mean of the three
other conditions, t(78) = 1.80, p = .07.
Acknowledgments
Ara Norenzayan, Jason Faulkner, & Mark Schaller, Department of Psychology, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. Scott Atran, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France and
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. Thanks to Eshanie Kirtisinghe, Brian Malley, and
Sheffield Yeung for their contributions to conducting the studies reported in this article. This
research has been supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
grant to the first author (Grant No. 410–2004–0197).
References
Alba, J. W., & Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic? Psychological Bulletin, 93, 203–231.
Anderson, J. R., & Schooler, L. J. (1991). Reflections of the environment in memory. Psychological Science, 2,
396–408.
Atran, S. (1998). Folkbiology and the anthropology of science: Cognitive universals and cultural particulars. Be-
havioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 547–609.
Atran, S. (2002). In Gods we trust: The evolutionary landscape of religion. Oxford, England: Oxford University
Press.
Atran, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2004). Religion’s evolutionary landscape: Counterintuition, commitment, compas-
sion, communion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 713–770.
Atran, S., & Sperber, D. (1991). Learning without teaching: Its place in culture. In L. T. Landsmann (Ed.), Culture,
schooling, and psychological development (pp. 39–55). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Avis, J., & Harris, P. L. (1991). Belief-desire reasoning among Baka children. Child Development, 62, 460–467.
Baillargeon, R. (1998). Infants’ understanding of the physical world. In M. Sabourin, F. Craik, & M. Robert (Eds.),
Advances in psychological science (Vol. 2, pp. 503–509). London: Psychology Press.
Barrett, J. L. (2000). Exploring the natural foundations of religion. Trends in Cognitive Science 4, 29–34.
A. Norenzayan, S. Atran, J. Faulkner, M. Schaller/Cognitive Science 30 (2006) 551
Barrett, J, L. (2004). Why would anyone believe in God? Lanham, MD: AltaMira.
Barrett, J. L., & Keil, F. (1996). Conceptualizing a non-natural entity: Anthropomorphism in God concepts. Cogni-
tive Psychology, 31, 219–247.
Barrett, J. L., & Nyhof, M. A. (2001). Spreading nonnatural concepts: The role of intuitive conceptual structures in
memory and transmission of cultural materials. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 1, 69–100.
Bartlett, F. A. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berger, J., & Heath, C. (2005). Idea habitats: How the prevalence of environmental cues influences the success of
ideas. Cognitive Science, 29, 195–221.
Berlin, B. (1992). Ethnobiological classification: Principles of categorization of plants and animals in traditional
societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Berlin, B., Breedlove, D., & Raven, P. (1973). General principles of classification and nomenclature in folk biology.
American Anthropologist, 74, 214–242.
Bower, G. H., Black, J. B., & Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts in memory for text. Cognitive Psychology, 11, 177–220.
Boyer, P. (1992). Explaining religious ideas: Outline of a cognitive approach. Numen, 39, 27–57.
Boyer, P. (1994a). Cognitive constraints on cultural representations: Natural ontologies and religious ideas. In L. A.
Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp.
391–411). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Boyer, P. (1994b). The naturalness of religious ideas. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York: Basic Books.
Boyer, P. (2003). Religious thought and behaviour as by-products of brain function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7,
119–124.
Boyer, P., & Ramble, C. (2001) Cognitive templates for religious concepts: Cross-cultural evidence for recall of
counter-intuitive representations. Cognitive Science, 25, 535–564.
Brewer, W. F. (1985). The story schema: Universal and culture-specific properties. In D. R. Olson, N. Torrance, &
A. Hildyard (Eds.), Literacy, language, and learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Callahan, T., Rochat, P., Liilard, A., Claux, M., Odden, H., Itakura, S., et al. (2005). Synchrony in the onset of men-
tal state reasoning: Evidence from five cultures. Psychological Science, 16, 378–384.
Carey, S., & Spelke, E. (1994). Domain-specific knowledge and conceptual change. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A.
Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for memory research. Journal of Ver-
bal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671–684.
Craik, F. I. M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of processing and the retention of words in episodic memory. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 104, 268–294.
Davidson, D. (1994). Recognition and recall of irrelevant and interruptive atypical actions in script-based stories.
Journal of Memory and Language, 33, 757–775.
Flavell, J. H., Zhang, X.-D., Zou, H., Dong, Q., & Qui, S. (1983). A comparison of the appearance-reality distinc-
tion in the People’s Republic of China and the United States. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 459–466.
Gardner, D., Harris, P. L., Ohmoto, M., & Hamazaki, T. (1988). Japanese children’s understanding of the distinction
between real and apparent emotion. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 11, 203–218.
Gelman, S. A., & Hirschfeld, L. A. (1998). How biological is essentialism? In D. L. Medin & S. Atran (Eds.),
Folkbiology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Heath, C., Bell, C., & Sternberg, E. (2001) Emotional selection in memes: The case of urban legends. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1028–1041.
Keil, F. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. Cambridge: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Keil, F. (1994). The birth and nurturance of concepts by domains: The origins of concepts of living things. In L.
Hirschfeld & S. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 234–254).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kelly, M. H., & Keil, F. (1985). The more things change … Metamorphoses and conceptual structure. Cognitive Sci-
ence, 9, 403–416.
Kintsch, W. (1994). Text comprehension, memory, and learning. American Psychologist, 49, 294–303.
552 A. Norenzayan, S. Atran, J. Faulkner, M. Schaller/Cognitive Science 30 (2006)
Kintsch, W., & Greene, L. (1978). The role of culture-specific schemata in the comprehension and recall of stories,
Discourse Processes, 1, 1–13.
Koriat, A., Goldsmith, M., & Pansky, A. (2000). Towards a psychology of memory accuracy. Annual Review of Psy-
chology, 51, 481–537.
Lawson, E. T., & McCauley, R. (1990) Rethinking religion. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Leslie, A. M. (1982). The perception of causality in infants. Perception, 11, 173–186.
Lillard, A. S. (1998). Ethnopsychologies: Cultural variations in theories of mind. Psychological Bulletin, 1, 3–32.
Manheim, R. (1977). Grimms’ tales for young and old: The complete stories. R. Manheim (Trans.). Garden City,
NY: Doubleday. (Original work published 1857)
McCabe, A., & Peterson, C. (1990). What makes a narrative memorable? Applied Psycholinguistics, 11, 73–82.
McNamara, D. S., Kintsch, E., Songer, N., & Kintsch, W. (1996). Are good texts always better? Interactions of text
coherence, background knowledge, and levels of understanding in learning from text. Cognition and Instruc-
tion, 14, 1–43.
McNamara, D. S., & Kintsch, W. (1996). Learning from texts: Effects of prior knowledge and text coherence. Dis-
course Processes, 22, 247–288.
Medin, D. L., & Atran, S. (Eds.). (1999). Folkbiology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Norenzayan, A., & Atran, S. (2004). Cognitive and emotional processes in the cultural transmission of natural and
nonnatural beliefs. In M. Schaller & C. Crandall (Eds.), The psychological foundations of culture. (pp.
149–169). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Norenzayan, A., & Atran, S. (2005). [Recall of intuitive and counterintuitive ideas in two cultures]. Unpublished
raw data.
Norenzayan, A., & Hansen, I. (2006). Belief in supernatural agents in the face of death. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 32, 174–187.
Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). Cross-cultural similarities and differences in the understanding of physical cau-
sality. In M. Shield (Ed.), Proceedings of the Seventh Interdisciplinary Conference on Science and Culture (pp.
10–21). Frankfort, KY: Kentucky State University Press.
Pyysiäinen, I., & Antonnen, V. (Eds.). (2002). Current approaches in the cognitive science of religion. New York:
Continuum.
Rosch, E., Mervis, C., Grey, W., Johnson, D., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories. Cogni-
tive Psychology, 8, 382–439.
Rubin, D. C. (1995). Memory in oral traditions. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Spelke, E. S. (1990). Principles of object perception. Cognitive Science, 14, 29–56.
Sperber, D. (1975). Rethinking symbolism. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd Ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell.
Stangor, C., & McMillan, D. (1992). Memory for expectancy-congruent and expectancy incongruent information:
A review of the social and social developmental literatures. Psychological Bulletin, 111, 42–61.
Thorndyke, P. W. (1977). Cognitive structures in comprehension and memory of narrative discourse. Cognitive Psy-
chology, 9, 77–110.
Waddill, P. J., & McDaniel, M. A. (1998). Distinctiveness effects in recall: Differential processing or privileged re-
trieval? Memory and Cognition, 26, 108–120.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about
false belief. Child Development, 72, 655–684.
A. Norenzayan, S. Atran, J. Faulkner, M. Schaller/Cognitive Science 30 (2006) 553
